WASHINGTON — Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned more than a dozen entities and vessels for their involvement in the shipment of Iranian crude oil and liquid petroleum gas to Syria and East Asia on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and Hizballah. Among the vessels sanctioned today are four ships associated with the fleet of illicit shipping Syrian magnate Abdul Jalil Mallah (Abdul Jalil) and his brother Luay al-Mallah. Since Abdul Jalil’s June 10, 2021 designation for his support to the network of IRGC-QF-backed Houthi financial official Sa’id al-Jamal, Luay al-Mallah has continued to use their shipping empire to support Iran’s malign activities and those of its proxies. Luay al-Mallah is also being designated in this action.
“Iran continues to rely heavily on the illicit sale of oil and liquid petroleum gas by the IRGC-QF and Lebanese Hizballah to fund its terrorist proxies and destabilizing activities,” said Acting Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Bradley T. Smith. “Treasury remains committed to disrupting the networks of shippers, brokers, and buyers that facilitate these schemes.”
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to counterterrorism authority Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended. OFAC designated the IRGC-QF pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 25, 2007, for providing material support to multiple terrorist groups. The U.S. Department of State designated Hizballah as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group (SDGT) pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 31, 2001.
Marshall Islands-registered, People’s Republic of China (PRC)-based Star Ocean Shipmanage Ltd. is the ship manager, technical manager, and operator of the Panama-flagged vessel ETERNAL SUCCESS (IMO: 9307633), the Panama-flagged ETERNAL 8 (IMO: 9232448), and the Panama-flagged ETERNAL PEACE (IMO: 9259745). The IRGC-QF used the ETERNAL SUCCESS to facilitate illicit trade as recently as July 2024, manipulating its Automatic Identification System to disguise its movements while sailing toward East Asia, where it transferred its cargo to another tanker via a ship-to-ship transfer. Similar to its sister ship, the ETERNAL 8 has also been involved in transferring shipments for the IRGC-QF.
Star Ocean Shipmanage Ltd. is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF. The ETERNAL SUCCESS, ETERNAL 8, and ETERNAL PEACE are being identified as property in which Star Ocean Shipmanage Ltd. has an interest.
Marshall Islands-based Dragon Road Ltd is the registered owner of the Panama-flagged SERENE I (IMO: 9197832). As recently as summer 2024, the SERENE I loaded IRGC-QF-owned products in Iran on behalf of the U.S.-sanctioned, Lebanese Hizballah-affiliated, Lebanon-based company Concepto Screen SAL Offshore. Similarly, the Panama-flagged FENG TAI (IMO: 9248473) transported IRGC-QF-owned products, loaded in Iran, to the PRC on behalf of Concepto Screen SAL Offshore. Hong Kong-based Tai Feng Hai Shipping Limited is the registered owner of the FENG TAI.
Dragon Road Ltd and Tai Feng Hai Shipping Limited are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF. SERENE I and FENG TAI are being identified as property in which Dragon Road Ltd and Tai Feng Hai Shipping Limited have an interest, respectively.
Luay al-Mallah has assisted his brother, sanctioned Syrian shipping magnate Abdul Jalil Mallah, in running his family’s business following the latter’s designation for assisting the illicit shipping network of Sa’id al-Jamal, an IRGC-QF-backed Houthi financial official. The Mallah family’s ships, including the Panama-flagged CONFIDENCE P (IMO: 9178044), Sao Tome and Principe-flagged NOVA (IMO: 9141259), Panama-flagged RIVAL (IMO: 9117818), and Iran-flagged TIYARA (IMO: 9231224), have facilitated illicit trade between Syria and Iran for the benefit of the IRGC-QF and Hizballah. As recently as 2021, Luay al-Mallah managed a shipment for Sa’id al-Jamal. In 2021, Sa’id al-Jamal’s network used the NOVA and TIYARA to facilitate illicit trade between Iran and Syria.
Luay al-Mallah owns the Abdul Jalil Mallah-directed, Türkiye-based Oryx Denizcilik Limited Sirketi.
Luay al-Mallah is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Abdul Jalil Mallah. Oryx Denizcilik Limited Sirketi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, directly or indirectly, Luay al-Mallah. CONFIDENCE P, NOVA, RIVAL, and TIYARA are being identified as property in which Abdul Jalil Mallah has an interest.
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons. U.S. persons may face civil or criminal penalties for violations of E.O. 13224, as amended. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. sanctions, including the factors that OFAC generally considers when determining an appropriate response to an apparent violation.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions with the individuals designated today entails risk of secondary sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended. Pursuant to this authority, OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant transaction on behalf of an SDGT.
In addition, financial institutions and other persons that engage in certain transactions or activities with the sanctioned entities and individuals may expose themselves to sanctions or be subject to an enforcement action. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
View identifying information on the individuals and entities designated today.
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